Delhi HC Refuses to Condon 541-Day Delay in POCSO Appeal, Calls State “Lethargic and Tardy”

The Delhi High Court dismissed a criminal leave petition filed by the State seeking to enhance the conviction of an accused from sexual assault to penetrative sexual assault, citing an 'unexplained' and 'enormous' delay of 541 days. Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Ravinder Dudeja, while refusing to condone the delay, observed that the State cannot claim a preferential standard in matters of limitation and that the law binds governmental authorities as much as private litigants.

The Bench noted that the administrative movement of files through various departments does not constitute a 'sufficient cause' for such inordinate delays. The Court also found that on the merits, the allegations of penetrative sexual assault were a material improvement over the initial version recorded in the FIR.

State's Failure to Justify Administrative Delay

Justice Ravinder Dudeja, writing for the Bench, remarked that the State's approach in filing the petition was 'utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent.' The Court emphasized that while Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 allows for a liberal construction of 'sufficient cause', it cannot be used to mechanically condone routine procedural delays. The Bench highlighted that the Law of Limitation is applicable to the Government just as it is to any other litigant.

The Court, in its reasoning, observed: "The Law of Limitation binds the State as much as it binds a private litigant, and the expression 'sufficient cause' must receive a reasonable and not a liberal construction where delay is inordinate and unexplained. The plea of delay in moving the files from one department to another is not a justified explanation for condoning abnormal delay."

Material Improvements and Lack of Medical Corroboration

Rationale on Penetrative Sexual Assault Charges

On the merits of the case, the State challenged the acquittal of the respondent under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. However, the Court observed that the allegation of digital rape appeared for the first time in the statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, approximately 14 months after the incident. The initial complaint and the medical examination did not support the claim of penetration.

Background:

The case originated from an incident involving a 10-year-old child. The Trial Court had convicted the respondent under Section 10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (aggravated sexual assault) but acquitted him of the more serious charge of penetrative sexual assault (Section 6). The State appealed this acquittal, arguing that the child's testimony was consistent and that statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 should have been applied.

The High Court, however, relied on the precedent set in State of Odisha & Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School ( "2026 SCC OnLine SC 191": 2026 CaseBase(SC) 235), reiterating that the Government must take responsibility for the omissions of its officers. The Bench found that the Trial Court’s view was plausible given the inconsistencies between the FIR and the later testimony, and the lack of medical evidence suggestive of penetrative assault. Finding no 'manifest perversity' in the lower court's judgment, the High Court refused to interfere with the acquittal on the graver charges.

Case Details:
Case No.: CRL.L.P. 232/2024 & CRL.M.A. 13696/2024
Case Title: STATE v. PAWAN
Appearances:
For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Aman Usman, APP with Mr. Manvendra Yadav, Adv.

Source: 2026 CaseBase(DEL) 298